In 11 T. Matsumoto and H. Imai described a new asymmetric algorithm based on multivariate polynomials of degree two o v er a nite eld. Then in 14 this algorithm was broken. The aim of this paper is to show that despite this result it is probably possible to use multivariate polynomials of degree two in carefully designed algorithms for asymmetric cryptography. In this paper we will give some examples of such s c hemes. All the examples that we will give, belong to two large family of schemes: HFE and IP. With HFE we will be able to do encryption, signatures or authentication in an asymmetric way. Moreover HFE with properly chosen parameters resist to all known attacks and can be used in order to give v ery short asymmetric signatures or very short encrypted messages of length 128 bits or 64 bits for example. IP can be used for asymmetric authentications or signatures. IP authentications are zero knowledge.
Introduction
Currently the security of most algorithms that we know in Asymmetric Cryptography for encryption or signatures rely on the not proved intractability of the factorisation or discrete log problem. So today one of the problems of Asymmetric Cryptography is to nd new and e cient algorithms for encryption or signatures that do not depend on these two closely related problems. For authentication, thanks to new algorithms for example 19 or 20 , the situation is much better now. Another problem of Asymmetric Cryptography i s t o n d a w a y t o h a v e v ery short asymmetric signatures the shorter outputs have actually about 320 bits, with the DSS algorithm for example, or 220 bits with C. Schnorr's algorithm, but we can imagine that a much shorter asymmetric signature may exist. Similarly another problem is to nd a way to perform asymmetric encryption with short length outputs when the inputs are short the shorter outputs have at the present about 512 bits. The main subject of this paper is to describe a new class of asymmetric algorithms, called HFE which stands for Hidden Field Equations". HFE is a candidate for these two problems. The security of HFE is not proved but apparently" it seems to be related to the problem of solving a system of multivariate quadratic equations over a nite eld for example GF2.
The general problem of solving a randomly selected system of multivariate quadratic equations over GF2 is NP-hard cf 9 p. 251, and it is a completely di erent problem from the factorisation problem or the discret log problem. However we will see that to recover a cleartext from an encrypted HFE text is not an NP complete problem, although this problem is expected to be exponentially di cult.
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Moreover HFE with some well chosen parameters will give us a candidate algorithm for asymmetric signatures of 128 bits, or even 64 bits ! Similarly when HFE is used for encryption, parameters can be chosen in order to encrypt messages by blocks of 128 bits, or even by blocks of 64 bits. However it should be noticed that HFE is not the rst try to use multivariate quadratic equations over F 2 = GF2 for an asymmetric cryptosystem: in 11 Matsumoto and Imai have designed such a n algorithm, called C , and this algorithm was broken in 14 .
Despite a lot of common points between HFE and the algorithm of 11 , HFE has been especially designed to resist all the ideas of the attacks of 14 and we h a v e made careful simulations about this. The second family of algorithms that we will present is called IP which stands for Isomorphisms of Polynomials". IP, as HFE can use public multivariate polynomials of degree 2 or more. However IP is very di erent from HFE. IP authentications can be proved to be zero knowledge.
This paper is divided in four parts:
1. In sections 2,3,4,5 we describe and comment the basic" HFE, i.e. the version of HFE with the easiest description. 2. In part II we will give some comments about the security of this basic" HFE, and we will describe the a ne multiple attack". This attack detects some weak keys but is not e cient against well chosen parameters. 3. In part III we will see that there are a lot of variations of the basic" HFE. 4 . In part IV we will see a very di erent algorithm: IP. IP is only for authentications or signatures. Finally we will conclude in section 24.
What is new in this extended version
In this extended version, many more details are given compared to the short paper version published in Crypto'96 with the same title. Moreover, some new sections have been added. For example:
1. In section 4.3, we explain how to generate HFE signatures of length only 64 bits in the short paper, we explained only for length 128 bits.
2. In section 5, the di erent w a ys to solve fx = y are explained.
3. In section 7 example 4, we study whether a new quadratic permutation, found by Hans Dobbertin in 7 , could be used in HFE. 4 . In section 9, we explain some of the unsuccessful tries we did to cryptanalyze the HFE schemes. 5. In part IV, more details are given about the IP problems. However, this extended version is mainly focused on HFE, since another paper 6 is devoted explicitly to the IP problems. 6 . In section 24, we present a HFE challenge with a total prize of US $1000, that we o er for breaking an explicit example of HFE asymmetric signature of 80 and 128 bits.
Part I: The basic HFE"
Mathematical Background
The main Mathematical properties needed are given in this section.
Function f
Let K be a nite eld of cardinal q and characteristic p typically but not necessary q = p = 2. Let L N be an extension of degree N of K. 
Inversion of f
f is not always a permutation of L N .
However the heart of our new algorithm HFE will be this theorem:
Theorem 2.1 Let L n be a nite eld, with jL n j = q n with q and n not too large" for example q 64 and n 1024. Let fx be a given polynomial in x in a eld L n , with a degree d not too large" for example d 1024.
Let a be an element of L n . Then it is always possible on a computer to nd all the roots of the equation fx = a .
Proof. This result is a classical result about the root nding of polynomials over nite elds. Proof of this result, i.e. the classical and e cient algorithms for root nding, can be found in 1 pp. 17-26, or in 10 c hapter 4 for example. Improved algorithms for root nding can be found in 21 and in 22 .
Moreover at the end of this Part I, in section 5 we give some results about the expected complexity o f theses algorithms, and how e cient they are on real values.
Notes.
1. Let d be the degree of the polynomial f.
Then for all a of L N there are at most d solutions x of fx = a . Moreover in practice there will be often very few solutions x of fx = a for example there will be often only 0, 1 or 2 solutions. 2. Sometimes f can be a permutation an Hermite's criterion" is given in 10 c hapter 7 for this.
However it seems to be di cult to nd how t o c hoose f to be a permutation when f has more than one monomial in x cf 10 c hapter 7 or 13 because only monomials in x q i + x q j or x q i are allowed. 3 3 Description of the basic HFE in encryption
In this section we will describe the basic" HFE algorithm for encryption, i.e. the version with the easiest description. The basic" HFE of this section is the HFE that we h a v e studied the most so far. We will give the other versions in part III of this paper, in order to show that there is really a large number of ways to obtain multivariate quadratic equations and to hide the trapdoor. Moreover we will sometimes assume that some redundancy has been put in the representation of the messages details about how this redundancy can be put are given below.
Encryption of x
The secret items will be:
1. An extension L n of K of degree n. 3. Two a ne bijections s and t of K n ! K n . These a ne bijections can be represented in a basis as polynomials of total degree one and with coe cients in K.
Note. It is also possible to consider that L n is public because it is possible to prove that instead of changing L n we will have the same result if we c hange s and t, s o w e can consider that L n is xed.
The ciphering is described in gure 1 this gure should be read from the top to the bottom. The An important point to notice is that since s and t are of degree one, and since f is of degree two i n a basis, the composition of all these operations will still be a quadratic function in a basis.
So this function can be given by n polynomials with coe cients in K, p 1 ; : : : ; p n . These polynomials give the components y 1 , ..., y n of the ciphertext y from the components x 1 , ..., x n of x: The public items are:
1. The eld K of q = p m elements, and the length n. 2. The n polynomials p 1 ; : : : ; p n i n n v ariables over K. 3 . The way to put redundancy in the messages i.e. the way to obtain x from M. So no secret is needed to encrypt a message M.
Moreover decryption will be easy if all the secret items are known since all the operations given in gure 1 will be inverted. The inversion of the function f will be obtained by solving a polynomial equation with one variable in the eld L n , as it is explained in section 2.2 and in section 5. It is important to notice that since f is not necessarily a bijection, we m a y nd more than one solution to this inversion we will nd at most d solutions because f is a polynomial of degree d in a commutative eld. However, as we are to see, thanks to the redundancy given for M, the right solution M will be found.
Redundancy
We give t w o examples that show h o w some redundancy can be put in order to recover the right solution.
Example 1 Redundancy in the cleartext x": Here, the length of the input x of the function is larger than the length of the message M, because in x we h a v e M + some redundancy. F or example if K = F 2 and if we w ant to cipher a message M of k bits we will introduce for example 64 extra bits of redundancy so the message will be represented by n = k + 64 elements of K.
A nice way to put the redundancy is to make use of an error correcting code. We can also suggest that x = MjjhM, where jj is the concatenation function and where hM is the 64 rst bits of a hash function such as MD5 or SHS. We can also use some simpler functions for hM but it is important that each bits of hM really depends on the bits of M in a non-linear way.
Example 2 Redundancy outside the cleartext x": Here, x = M is the message, where no special redundancy has been put. However, the ciphertext Y is not only y, but y + a one-way function of x. For example, the ciphertext is Y = yjjHashx, where jj is the concatenation function, Hash is a public one-way hash function for example Hash=MD5 or SHS, and y = tfsx as before.
It can be noticed that if Hash is a collision-free one-way hash function, then we will always be sure to nd only one solution for the cleartext x.
Remarks : 2. Of course, the redundancy is always done with public functions or equations in order to have a public key encryption scheme. 5
Attack with related messages Let y be the ciphertext of x, and let y 0 be the ciphertext of x + d, where d is a constant. If y, y 0 and d are known, then x will be easily found because y , y 0 is of degree one in the x i variables. A similar property exists in RSA when the public exponent is less than than 32 bits large see 4 . For some applications, such a property m ust be avoided. For that purpose, one solution is to publish a public permutation g for example g is a DES with a public key K and to encrypt by y = HFEgx instead of y = HFEx. Another solution might be to padd the plaintext with random bits.
This concludes the description of the basic" HFE algorithm for encryption. 4 The basic HFE in signature and authentication
We will now see three examples of how w e can use HFE for asymmetric signatures. In the rst example the signatures will have 160 bits, in the second example the signatures will have about 128 bits, and in the third example, the signatures will have about 64 bits or even about 32 bits if we allow v ery slow signature veri cation !. Let us consider an HFE algorithm, as described in the next sections, with x and y of about 128+32=160 bits.
Let P 1 ; : : : ; P n be the n public polynomials that give y from x, with n = 160 and K = F 2 for example.
If only P 1 to P 128 of these polynomials are public the over are secret, then the polynomials P 1 ; : : : P 128 , give a v alue z of 128 bits from a value x of 160 bits. In our algorithm here z is the hash of a message to sign and x will be the signature of z. When z is given, then with the secret polynomials P 129 to P 160 and the other secret values we will be able to nd a v alue x so that from this x, the polynomials P 1 ; : : : ; P 128 will give exactly the value z.
For this we will padd z with 32 extra bits and try to nd an x with a decryption of the HFE algorithm.
If it fails we try with another padding until we succeed. In gure 2 we illustrate such a use of HFE in signature. 
Example 2
Computation of the signature
In this example 2 to sign a message M there will be three steps.
Step 1. We generate a small integer R with no block o f n umbers with 10000 in its expression in base 2 for example R = 0 to start.
Step 2. We compute hRjj10000jjM where h is a public collision free hash function with an output of 128 bits for example h is the MD5 algorithm.
Step 3. 
Length of the signature
In this example 2 the length of the signature is not xed. However in average R will be very small so that the signature Rjjx will have i n a v erage just a few more than 128 bits.
Note. Of course the pattern 10000 is just an example and another pattern P can be chosen. More precisely the property that we w ant is that from RjjPjjM we can recover R and M when we know that R do not have the pattern P. So the pattern will have at least one 1 and one 0.
Example 3
Step 1, Step 2: These steps are as in example 2 above. We denote by h 1 the rst 64 bits of the hash value, and by h 2 the last 64 bits of the hash value.
Step Length of the signature
In this example 3 as in example 2, the length of the signature is not xed. However, in average, R will be very small, so that the signature RjjS will have i n a v erage just a little more than 64 bits.
Remark 1: If we allow slower signature veri cation, it is also possible to have e v en shorter signatures.
For example, R will not be put in the signature, so that all the small values of R will be tried to verify a signature. Moreover, we can also decide that only the rst 32 bits of S are given as the signature: the 32 other bits will have to be found by exhaustive search during a signature veri cation. In this case, the signature veri cation is very slow it takes a few hours !, but the signatures have only 32 bits ! Remark 3: Of course, by increasing the number of F ,1 computations in the de nition of S, w e will make the attack given in remark 2 less and less e cient i.e. its complexity will become closer and closer to 2 64 , but this is at the cost of more computations in the generation and veri cation of a signature. Moreover, it also increases the average number of R values to try to get a signature.
The basic HFE in authentication
It is well known that each asymmetric algorithm that can be used for ciphering or for signature can also be used for authentication. So we can use the HFE algorithms for authentication.
For example we can encrypt a challenge with the public polynomials P 1 ; : : : ; P n , and ask for the clear- Let f be a polynomial of degree d in F q n, where q = p m , p prime. Let y 2 F q n. W e w ant to nd all the solutions x 2 F q n so that fx = y . W e will assume that p is small and that the computation of an operation in F q is very easy for example we h a v e stored the tables of and + in F q . More precisely the integer m is de ned such that the operations in F p m can be considered as one unit of operation. For example typically m 8 in practice on a computer since it is then easy to store the 2 2m values of the tables of and +.
The classical algorithms
There are three classical algorithms for this very general problem: the Berlekamp-Rabin algorithm, the Berlekamp trace algorithm, and a linearized polynomial algorithm. A description of these algorithms can be found in 1 pp.17-26 or in 10 c hapter 4. We will just give here their expected complexity. HFE can work with odd prime p but we h a v e mainly studied the case of p = 2 . S o w e h a v e not actually used the Berlekamp-Rabin algorithm. 8 b. The linearized polynomial algorithm As we will see in section 7 a careful analysis of the possible linearisation of the polynomial fx , y is important t o a v oid weak keys.
However, we can always use a linearisation of the polynomial fx,y to nd the solutions x of fx = y when we h a v e the secret key, e v en if this linearised polynomial is useless for a cryptanalyst. c. The Berlekamp trace algorithm This algorithm is quite e cient for large extension elds F q n, where q is small.
We h a v e only studied the algorithm when q = 2 m , but the algorithm is also e cient for small odd q.
With the same notations as before i.e. when operations in F q are the basic operations the average expected complexity of the algorithm is in Omn For example we can design an algorithm like this:
Step 1. Find an a ne multiple Ax o f f x as in the linearized polynomial algorithm.
Step 2. Compute Bx = x 2 mn + x modulo Ax.
Step 3. Compute Cx = GCDAx; B x .
Step 4. Compute GCDCx; f x = P x .
Step 5. If the degree of P is small then solve Px = 0 immediately if degree of P = 1, or with the Berlekamp Trace algorithm.
If the degree of P is not small then go back to step 2 with a trace function instead of x 2 mn + x.
The expected time for such an algorithm is in average in Odmn More generally we can use the values of the Trace E=F i , with increasing sub elds F i ; F 1 F 2 : : : to try to factor f.
So we can design an algorithm like this:
Step 1. Compute and store all the u k = x 2 k mod fx; 1 k mn. Let Px = x 2 mn + x mod fx.
Step 2. Compute GCDPx; f x = Fx.
Step Step 5. If all the roots of Fx h a v e not been found after Step 4 then we will use the classical Berlekamp Trace algorithm to achieve the factorisation i.e. we will use some Tr j x .
The expected average complexity of this algorithm is in Omd 2 n 3 .
Step 1 is expected to be in Omd 
Example of smart card secret key computations
Usually, with HFE, the smartcard performs the public key computations and a computer performs the secret key computations. However, we can also evaluate the RAM needed and the time to perform a secret key computation F ,1 in a smartcard in some cases, as in example 3 of signature, three such F ,1 computations are required.
Family 1 of secret key computation
In this family, computations like x 2 m + x mod fx Step 1, and then GCDAx; B x
Step 2 are required, where Ax, Bx and fx are polynomials of degree d.
Step 1 requires about Odmn 
Family 2 of secret key computation
We can also imagine that a linearized polynomial Ax has been precomputed so we h a v e to solve Ax = 0 b y Gaussian reductions. In this case, about n 3 computations are required for the Gaussian reductions ' 4T with n = 32, but before the terms in Ax will have t o b e e v aluated, and this sometimes requires a lot of time. The RAM needed is about n 2 2 elements of F q we divide by t w o because there is a Gaussian reduction and the equations can be computed one by one. This is about . Asymptotically these algorithms are faster but these complexities are the complexity for practical values of m; d; n. Moreover they are algorithms for very general polynomials f. F or special polynomials f for example when f has just a few monomials with only one large exponent much faster algorithms may exist.
However some of these special polynomials, are weak choices for the basic HFE, as we will see in section 7.
Part II: About the security of the basic HFE 6 Theoretical considerations about the security of the basic HFE
How t o c hoose the parameters
We h a v e mainly studied HFE in characteristic 2. However, in opposition to the Matsumoto-Imai scheme of 11 which needed p = 2, with HFE we can have a n y small prime value for p.
For security of the basic HFE it is necessary that:
1. The message M has at least 64 bits. If not it is easy to nd M by exhaustive search. So when some redundancy is put in x, then x and y may h a v e at least about 128 bits. When the redundancy is put outside x, then x and y will have at least 64 bits. 2. The number n of variables in the public key is such that d 2:7n or ' 2 64 , where d = 2 in the basic HFE is the degree of the public equations. So n 23. This comes from the fact that there are some general Gr obner-bases algorithms able to compute the solutions of any set of equations of degree d with n variables with complexity about Od 3n in theory and about Od 2:7n empirically cf 8 . Remark : in 11 , it was recommended to have n 32, also to roughly avoid the general Gr obner-bases algorithms. However, n 23 seems to be a more precise evaluation. 3. The polynomial f must have at least two monomials in x. If not the basic HFE will be in fact just a Matsumoto-Imai algorithm and will be attacked as shown in 2 . More generally, the polynomial f must be chosen in order that the a ne multiple attack" that we will describe in section 7, and the quadratic attack" that we will study in section 8, will require too much computations to be performed.
However, it is not always easy to test when these attacks on a polynomial f can be dangerous or not. So instead of doing that, and in order to avoid all the weak keys, we suggest in characteristic p = 2 to choose for f a random quadratic over where all the i are random elements of F 2 n, or we suggest the parameters given in the two c hallenges of section 24. Moreover in order to make things even more di cult for a cryptanalysis we will see in section 11 that we can eliminate some public polynomials, and add some others. 
Comparison between the basic HFE and Matsumoto-Imai algorithm
The Matsumoto-Imai algorithm of 11 can be seen as a weak key version of the basic HFE algorithms. The main new ideas that we h a v e i n troduced in the design of HFE are:
1. Not to have necessary a bijection, since we will be able to encrypt and to sign without bijections. 2. To use the fact that a lot of practical algorithms are known to nd the roots of a lot polynomials in a nite eld. For example it is always possible to nd the roots when the polynomial is a univariate polynomial of not too large degree. For security HFE may b e m uch stronger than the Matsumoto-Imai algorithm because:
1. The equations found in 13 to attack the Matsumoto-Imai algorithm do not exist in general HFE schemes. Moreover we h a v e made simulations to check this point. , , ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  ,  ,  ,  ,   ,  ,  ,  , ,  ,,  ,  , Matsumoto-Imai algorithm.
: w eak key versions. 2. In Matsumoto-Imai algorithm very few possibilities existed for f, s o w e could assume that f was public. However in HFE we h a v e m uch more possible functions f so the cryptanalyst can no longer assume that f is public. HFE may still be secure if f is public, since its security m a y essentially be in the secrets a ne functions s and t this point leads to the IP authentication and signature scheme that we present in Part IV. The function f is hidden", by the a ne functions s and t, as the name HFE shows, but the function f is not necessary secret. However to keep f secret can only increase the security, so we actually prefer to recommend to keep f secret.
Note. It is possible to prove that if the two exponents in x of higer degree are 1 and 2 , with 2 , 1 coprime with q n , 1, then we can assume, without loosing generality, that the coe cients in x 1 and x 2 are 1. 3. The fact that some of the P i polynomials could not be made public could also increase the security of HFE since the trapdoor is then even more hidden" this point will be seen in section 9. Public key computations are easy in HFE for example they can easilly be done in low cost smart cards. However, from a practical point of view, the basic HFE is slower in secret key computations than Matsumoto-Imai algorithm since the computation of f ,1 is more complex.
Brassard Theorem
Some authentication algorithms such as 19 or 20 are proved to be as secure as a NP-hard problem. This is a very nice result of security but of course this is not a proof of absolute security: a problem can be NP-hard but easy in average, or easy with bad parameters or di cult only with very large parameters. Can we also hope to prove that HFE is as secure as a NP-hard problem? No: from a generalisation of a theorem given by G. Brassard in 2 , we can prove that recovering a cleartext from an encrypted HFE text is never an NP-hard problem if NP 6 = co NP. However this is not really a aw of HFE, but a property of almost all asymmetric encryption algorithms.
Idea of the proof. Let F be an asymmetric encryption algorithm with a secret key K and a public key k such that, when the secret key K is given and when a value y is given, it is always very easy to see if there is or not a cleartext x such that y = F k x, i.e. such that y is the encryption of x by the algorithm F with the public key k. HFE, as all e cient encryption algorithms such as RSA has of course this property. N o w let us consider the problem: Is there an x such that y = F k x?", where y is a given value. Then if the answer is yes", x is a certi cate that indeed the answer is yes", i.e. it is easy to verify that the answer is yes" if such a n x is given K is also another certi cate. Moreover if the answer is no", K is a certi cate that indeed the answer is no". So this problem is in NP co NP. But if NP 6 = co NP there is no NP-hard problem in NP co NP. Similarly if from the secret key K we can compute easilly all the x such that y = F k x, then the problem: Is there an x such that y = F k x and a x b?", where a and b are two i n tegers, is also in NP co NP. So recovering a cleartext x from its corresponding ciphertext y can not be a NP-hard problem. This shows that there is little hope to design any practical asymmetric encryption algorithm with a security proved to be based on a NP-hard problem. It is also instructive to see that RSA may or may not be as secure as the factorisation problem because the factorisation problem is in NP co NP so is not a NP-hard problem.
Comments about Brassard Theorem:
One can think that this result could suggest that when we h a v e i n troduced a trapdoor in HFE, in order to have a cryptosystem useful for encryption, we m a y h a v e w eakened the problem. This result may also suggest that the problem on which the security of HFE relies is not clearly shown it may not be the general NP-hard problem of solving randomly selected system of multivariate quadratic equations over GF2. The same sort of suggestions occured for asymmetric encryption algorithms based on the knapsack problem, because the knapsack problem is also NP-hard. For example, in 3 p . 506, it is written: ... then it seems likely that there is an attack on the Merckle-Hellmann knapsack cryptosystem that runs faster than algorithms that solve the general knapsack problem". However, some people in the cryptographic community do not share this idea that Brassard theorem suggest" that some attack m a y exist that runs faster than algorithms to solve a more general NP-hard problem. And in fact, it is important to notice that the theorem does not give a n y explicit attack neither does it prove that some more e cient attack exist. Let us consider again the following problem:
Input: A ciphertext message of a public key cryptosystem and an integer n.
Question: Is the n-th bit of the corresponding cleartext equal to 1 ?
As seen above, this problem is in NP co NP, hence it cannot be NP-hard unless NP = co NP. However, this remark gives no practical attack and moreover for some asymmetric encryption algorithm, the best algorithm might be the exhaustive search of the cleartext. So, despite the fact that this problem is not NP-hard, it might happen that the best algorithm is exhaustive search... Similarly, in an HFE algorithm, recovering a cleartext from its HFE ciphertext is expected to be exponentially di cult when the HFE parameters are properly chosen. However, despite the fact that it gives no attack, we believe that it is very relevant to take Brassard theorem into account, because from this theorem we know that we m ust not spend time in trying to prove that HFE is as secure as a NP-hard problem.
Security Simulations
In order to test the security of the Basic HFE we h a v e made two sets of simulations:
1. Computation of some a ne in x m ultiple of fx , y. This is described in section 7. 2. For n = 17 and n = 22, we h a v e also made Toy simulations in order to see if the attacks given in
The From now o n w e will assume for simplicity that the characteristic is 2.
Moreover, sometimes for such an a ne multiple Ax; y all the exponents in y have small Hamming Weight in base 2. If this occurs, then the polynomial f will be a weak key for HFE. More precisely if all the exponents in y have a Hamming Weight k, then there will be an attack with a Gaussian reduction on On In this a ne multiple Ax; y = 0 o f f x , the largest Hamming weight of the exponents in y is 3. As a result, this leads to an attack with a Gaussian reduction on On 4 terms if this polynomial fx i s used. Therefore, we do not recommend to use this polynomial.
Remarks: 1. Our main motivation to study this polynomial comes from the fact that Hans Dobbertin proved that fx is a permutation see 7 .
2. This polynomial f will also be studied in section 8.1 for n = 13, and we will show there that no relation with Hamming weight 2 i n y and a ne in x exist. In fact Ax; y here has a Hamming weight = 3 i n y so it is indeed 3. This attack will need a lot of power but may be feasible. For example if n = 64 it will need Gaussian reduction on 2 25 variables ' n 5 =4! and if n = 128 it will need Gaussian reduction on 2 30 variables: : : . So we do not recommend to use this function f. W e h a v e just presented this function in order to show the increasing complexity of the a ne multiple attack when di erent functions are chosen.
Remark. This polynomial f will also be studied in section 8.2 for n = 13 and we will show there that no relation with Hamming Weight 2 i n y and a ne in x exist. In fact Ax; y here has a Hamming Weight = 4 i n y , and this is indeed 3 as expected. So this polynomial f should not be used for HFE. Since the degree of f was not so small it was 12, and since f had a lot of monomials 6, this example shows that the a ne multiple attack has to be taken seriously: it is not always obvious whether it works or not. With AXIOM also after two d a ys of computations we h a v e computed the least a ne multiple Ax; y of fx + y . I n A x; y the exponents with the largest Hamming Weight h a v e a Hamming Weight also of 11. So this function may also be a strong polynomial for HFE.
Note: What is nice with this function is that this function is not only quadratic over F 2 but also quadratic over F 4 . So the public computations will be easier with this function. So this polynomial f may be a good choice for HFE.
Moreover this f is not only quadratic over F 2 but also over F 16 , and this will give easier public key computations.
However, even if Ax; y is not useful, it has a particulary short expression and this may means that fx i s v ery special, so it's perhaps more risky to choose this fx than a random polynomial, quadratic over F 2 , and of degree 17.
Asymptotic complexity
For large d, and for most of the polynomials f of degree d, the degree in x of the a ne multiple Ax; y will be q d,1 , the largest Hamming weight of the exponents in y is expected to be in Od, so that the complexity of the a ne multiple attack of the basic HFE with this polynomial f is expected to be in On Od . So, if d = On the complexity of the attack is expected to be exponential in n. Of course public and secret computations for the legitimate users are polynomials in n, but the attack is expected to be exponential in n.
Moreover, d = Oln n is expected to be su cient t o a v oid all polynomial attacks.
Conclusion
The a ne multiple attack i s v ery e cient for some very special polynomials. However when the degree of f is 17 and when f has enough monomials of Hamming Weight t w o i n x , this attack is expected to fail completely. Moreover, for some polynomials of practical interest it is even possible to compute with AXIOM the least a ne in x m ultiple of these polynomials and to see if the attack will work or fail with this a ne multiple. Therefore, there will be some linear functions u and v such that vy = P u x , where y = Px is the public key. It is not clear whether this may be dangerous, but this can suggest to choose very general terms and not only 0 and 1.
Note For easier computations, we

The quadratic" attack Idea of the attack
In section 7, we generate some a ne relations on the bits of the cleartext when an explicit value for the ciphertext y is given.
In this section 8, we n o w study how some quadratic relations on the bits of the cleartext might b e useful in order to recover the cleartext. The motivation is that as we will see in the tables computed in section 9 for many polynomials f, w e can indeed obtain more such quadratic relations than we have in the public key.
Let be the number of independent quadratic equations obtained on the bits of the cleartext. If is larger than, or is approximately nn+1 2 , then by Gaussian reductions on X ij = x i x j , w e will probably obtain the value x. Moreover, even if is smaller than nn+1 2 , these equations will give an attack more e cient than the exhaustive search o n x . W e will be able to nd by Gaussian reductions on X ij = x i x j about p 2 variables, so that we will have to perform an exhaustive search on only n, p 2 variables.
The cubic" attack, or higher degree attacks
From a theoretical point of view, we can also imagine to collect some cubic equations in the bits of the cleartext or even of higher degree. However, the detection of such equations requires a lot of computing power, so that we did no simulations on this. Moreover, if we assume that after maybe a lot of computations cubic equations in x i have been found, then we will have to perform exhaustive search o n n , 3 p 6 v ariables instead of n.
9 Toy simulations with small n 9.1 Classi cation of the equations Despite the fact that it is a bit boring, we will describe in this section the di erent families of equations of total degree two or three that are stable by a ne transformation on x i and y j variables.
Equations of degree total two and of degree one in x: Remark: We will make some simulations with those equations XY 2 . For any quadratic functions y i , i n t h e x j v ariables, we will always have nn+1 trivial" equations XY g 3 is a random polynomial of degree 128 with Hamming weight t w o i n x o v er F 4 , i.e. with degrees 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17, 20, 32, 64, 65, 68, 80, 128. g 4 is a random polynomial of degree 257 with Hamming weight t w o i n x o v er F 4 , i.e. with degrees 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 16, 17, 20, 32, 64, 65, 68, 80, 128, 256, 
Examples of attacks that do not work
In 15 I h a v e presented some attacks that work very well against some asymmetric cryptosystems with multivariate polynomials and a hidden monomial. So a natural question is: do these attacks also work against HFE ? In this section, we will see why it seems that these attacks do not work against HFE.
Step 1. We compute the vector space of all the equations Step 2. We isolate the terms in x i y j . W e h a v e like this some expressions d 1 ; : : : ; d k .
Step 3. We compute the vector space of the linear transformations C and D such that the transfor- Step 4. Similarly, w e compute the vector space of the linear transformations C 0 and D 0 such that the transformations C 0 on d has the same e ect as the transformation D 0 on y.
Step 5. From step 3, the idea of the cryptanalysis is to nd the analogy of a multiplication on the y i variables, and from step 4 the analogy of a multiplication on the x i variables.
Now from these multiplications we m a y nd the analogy of the secret function f and we m a y b e able to compute x from y with this analogy.
Example. From 4, can we s a y that steps 3, 4 and 5 will succeed, i.e. that we will nd the vector space for C;D and C 0 ; D 0 and that these vector spaces will be of dimension n because we h a v e n degree of liberty for ? No. Because in step 1 equation 3 will be mixed with all the multiplication of the n public equations by each x i ; 1 i n. So for C;D w e will have m uch more solutions than only the multiplication by an element of K.
Remark. More precisely, in step 1 we will nd exactly the vector space of dimension nn + 1 generated from the n original public equations, and these equations multiplied by x i , and nothing else. This is because we will nd at least this vector space of dimension nn + 1, and exactly this vector space, because if we had more equations, then by Gaussian reductions, we w ould have a polynomial P such that Px 1 ; :::; x n for any x 1 ; :::; x n . But this implies P = 0. As a result, no information for an attack can be obtained from equations X In 15 , a similar attack is done, and works very well against some asymmetric cryptosystems, but here it does not work because the quadratic expressions in x i in the public equations" are exactly y 1 , ..., y n , s o w e will nd all C;D solutions where D = C, and where C is any linear transformation not only the transformations multiplication by ". 27 Part III: HFE variations 11 Three simple variations 11.1 Less public polynomials The polynomials P 1 ; : : : ; P n of the basic" HFE algorithm give y from x. H o w ever, it is possible to keep secret some of these polynomials. Let k be the number of these polynomials P i that we do not give in the public key, so that only P 1 , P 2 , ..., P n,k are public.
In an encryption scheme, k must be small, because in order to recover x from y, w e will compute the 2 km possibilities for y, compute all the corresponding possible x, and nd the good x thanks to the redundancy.
When m is very small, for example when m = 1 or 2, and when k is very small, for example with k = 1 or 2, this is clearly feasible. In a signature scheme, k may b e m uch larger. However, we m ust still have enough polynomials P i in order that the problem of nding a value x, whose images by P 1 , ..., P n,k are given values, is still intractable. A value k = 1 , 2 , o r k = n 2 for example may be practical and e cient.
Note: This idea to keep secret some polynomials P i may increase, or not, the security of some schemes. In Part IV, we will study the cryptanalytic e ects of this idea on the original C scheme.
Introducing some random polynomials
Let P i be the public polynomials in x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n , of a basic" HFE scheme. We can imagine to introduce some random extra quadratic polynomials Q i in x 1 , ..., x n , and to mix the polynomials Q i and P i with a secret a ne bijection in the given public key. Let k be the number of these Q i polynomials.
In a signature scheme, k must be small, because for a given x, the probability to satisfy these extra Q i equations is 1 2 km . When m and k are small, the scheme is e cient: after about 2 km tries, we will obtain a signature.
In an encryption scheme, k may b e m uch larger. However, the total number k + n of quadratic public equations must be such that the problem of nding x from a given y is still intractable hence k + n must be nn+1 it is possible to design a signature or an encryption scheme from a basic" HFE with polynomials P 1 , ..., P n , b y k eeping P n secret, introducing a random polynomial Q n instead of P n , and computing the public key as a secret a ne transformation of P 1 , ..., P n,1 , Q n .
Introducing more x i variables
In signature, it is easy to introduce more x i variables. In a basic" HFE scheme, we h a v e b = f a , In 1, let now i be an element o f L n such that each o f t h e n components of i in a basis is a secret random linear function of the variables a 0 1 , ..., a 0 k . And in 1, let now 0 be an element o f L n such that each one of the n components of 0 in a basis is a secret random quadratic functions of the variables a 0 1 , ..., a 0 k . Then, the n + k variables a 1 , ..., a n , a 0 1 , ..., a 0 k , will be mixed in the secret a ne bijection s in order to obtain the variables x 1 , ..., x n+k . And, as before, tb 1 ; :::; b n = y 1 ; :::; y n , where t is a secret a ne bijection. Then the public key is given as the n equations y i = P i x 1 ; :::; x n+k . To compute a signature, the values a 0 1 , ..., a 0 k will simply be chosen at random. Then, the values 0 and i will be computed. Then, the monovariate equation 1 will be solved in a i n L n .
Note: This ideas, as before, may o r m a y not increase the security of some schemes.
12 HFE with a multivariate hidden equation
In this section another variation of the HFE algorithm will be shown.
Here the idea is to change the description of the function f given in section 2.1. We can notice that what we need for f is that:
1. In a basis, f is a multivariate quadratic function. 2. For any v alue a, it is easy to nd all the x so that fx = a . 3. f is a function K n ! K n with numbers in K n with at least 64 bits. The solution given in part I was to choose for f a polynomial in only one variable x over K n so that, in a basis, f is a multivariate quadratic function. However we can imagine a lot of di erent solutions than that for f. For example we can imagine that f is a polynomial in two v ariables, x 1 and x 2 , so that:
1. In a basis, the expression of f is still a multivariate polynomial of total degree two. 2. For any a, it is possible to nd all the x 1 ; x 2 so that fx 1 ; x 2 = a .
Example
For example let us assume that n = 128 and q = p = 2 , s o K = F 2 . :4 Now w e can notice that 4 is a polynomial equation with only one variable x 1 in a nite eld. So it is possible to nd x 1 , and then from 3 we will nd x 2 .
An advantage of such a s c heme is that the secret computations may be easier than the secret computations of the Basic HFE, because in the equation 4 the variable x 1 has only n=2 bits instead of n bits for the Basic HFE. 29
More general cases More generally, polynomials with 3, 4 or more variables can be used so that an algorithm of inversion of f exists and the expression of f in a basis is quadratic.
Moreover a lot of di erent algorithms are known to nd the roots of speci c multivariate polynomials in a nite eld for example Grobner basis, or speci c algorithms in Algebric Geometry and each o f this algorithm could lead to a speci c HFE algorithm.
13 HFE with more than one branch, and HRE: Hidden Ring Equations 13 .1 HFE with more than one branch
In analogy with the Matsumoto-Imai algorithm of 11 w e can imagine a HFE algorithm with more than one branch in order to have easier secret computations.
Let d be the number of branchs. The algorithm proceeds like this: 1. The rst a ne transformation s is performed on x obtaining a = sx. 4. The last a ne transformation t is performed on b = b 1 jj : : : jjb d , obtaining y = tb. If we could have v ery short branchs for example if we could have branchs which manipulate values a i of less than 16 bits then the algorithm would be really very e cient. However it can be proved that for the security of the scheme each branch m ust manipulate values a i of at least 64 bits. We do not give too many details here because in the paper 16 written with Louis Goubin, we give a detailed analysis of all the cryptanalysis of short branchs that we h a v e found. So for 128 bit messages for example there is no more than 2 branches. So there cannot be a lot of small branches, so the main practical interests of more than one branch h a v e disappeared. So in conclusion we do not recommend to use more than one branch in HFE.
HRE: Hidden Rings Equations
In section 2.1 we said that the eld L N is typically K X =i N X, where i N X is an irreductible polynomial over K. If i N X is not irreductible, then L 0 N = K X =i N X will then not be a nite eld, but a nite ring. In such a space the resolution of fx = y , where f is a univariate polynomial is still feasible. For example the linearized polynomial algorithm still works.
So we can design an asymmetric scheme in such a space exactly as HFE in the nite eld L N .
We can call such an algorithm HRE for Hidden Rings Equations. However it seems that we obtain no advantage to use HRE instead HFE.
HFE with s and t with values in a sub eld
In order to have a smaller value for the length of the public key, an idea is to have a public key with all the values of the coe cients in a sub eld k of K = F q = F p m. In order to achieve this:
1. The values of the matrices of s and t will be chosen if k.
2. The irreducible polynomial ' such that F q n ' F q X ='Xwill be chosen in k X .
3. The polynomial f will also be chosen in k X .
To obtain condition 2, we will choose n such that GCDn; m = 1 because it is possible to prove that is ' is a polynomial of F p X of degree n, irreducible on F p and if GCDn; m = 1, then ' is also irreducible over F p m. A t the present, it is not clear whether restricting HFE with conditions 1, 2 and 3 is dangerous for its security or not.
Example: Let 
Speed of decryption
The main advantage of this scheme is that decryption with the secret keys may b e v ery fast, as we will see now. From y 1 and y 2 , f 1 a and f 2 a will be obtained, and then GCDf 1 a; f 2 a will be computed. Then from this GCD the value of a will be obtained with one of the classical algorithm of resolution of equation like in section 5. Then x = s ,1 1 a will be obtained.
In So the complexity of decryption with the secret key of the scheme of this section 10 will be 0n ln 3 n asymptoticaly with well chosen f 1 and f 2 . This is really very fast for example the decryption with the secrets of RSA and of most public key scheme is asymptoticaly 0n 2 ln n.
Security
In this scheme we h a v e only encrypt x with two di erent but not independent HFE to recover x from y 1 jjy 2 these two HFE are not independents since s 1 = s 2 .
However it is not recommended generally in cryptography to encrypt the same message twice by t w o di erent encryptions. Moreover this is generally particulary not recommended when the two encryptions are not independents. So if this algorithm is really used we recommend to be extra-careful in the choice of the polynomials f 1 and f 2 . F or example not only f 1 and f 2 should avoid the A ne multiple attack" of Part II, section 7, but also f 1 + f 2 . However if great care are done in the selection of f 1 and f 2 it seems that this scheme may be secure.
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Variations
Of course, instead of a concatenation of two HFE, which gives y 1 jjy 2 , w e can also choose an output which is an a ne and bijective secret transformation of y 1 jjy 2 . However this do not change a lot of thing both for secret key computations and from a cryptanalitic point of view. 16 HFE with public polynomials of degree 3 Of course we can also choose for f a polynomial with some exponents in x of Hamming Weight still small but 3. A v ery important subcase is when this function is fx = x 1+2 +2 ' , i.e. with only one monomial and Hamming Weight 3. The study of these functions is one of the main subject of 15 .
